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Abstract:The study of common-pool resources (CPRs) has become increasingly important in social 
sciences. CPRs emphasize a more inclusive use and an institutional and normative community-based 
approach. However, this approach is exposed to access, sustainability, and democracy risks. This paper 
shows the interest that the rationality of the institutions for the commons can have for the legal sphere and, 
particularly, for human rights. Both are characterized by powerful democratic legislation and share concern 
for meeting the needs of the subjects involved and for the effectiveness of their contents and guarantees.
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4. conclusIon
1. tHe emergence of commons
Commons made a significant impact on social sciences at the end of the 20th 
century. In the academic field, the main trigger was the publication of Governing the 
Commons (Östrom, 1990). This work draws on research conducted in previous decades by 
the Political Theory and Policy Analysis research group at Indiana University.2 The group’s 
research aimed at the functioning of common-pool resources (CPRs) such as aquifers, 
fisheries or forests. Based on that research, they inferred some general characteristics 
of the nature of these resources and their institutional functioning. The most important 
aspect of CPRs is not the object on which they have been established (the well, the 
forest or the software) or their particular characteristics, but the fact that they have been 
institutionalized, in other words, their institutional dimension. This implies the existence 
of a community that has given itself a set of explicit and implicit norms (Hess and Östrom, 
2016b: 66), methods of participation and mechanisms of law enforcement.3
In political terms, the notion of CPRs or, more loosely, commons, has served to 
analyze how the property regime has expanded to become the paradigmatic regime of 
the relationship and availability of things, with a tendency to adopt an absolute character. 
1 Adjunct Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of Zaragoza, Spain, (dvila@unizar.es)
2 There is a database on CPRs and research associated with this group, called the Digital Library of the 
Commons (https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/).
3 See Östrom (1990: 90–102) for a more systematic explanation of the principles of CPR operation.
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In historical terms, a first process of transition from the commons regime to a private or 
public property regime ―called enclosing― has been noted, particularly in CPRs related 
to popular economics in the Modern Age (Polanyi, 2001; Laval and Dardot, 2015: 282 and 
ff.; Federici, 2010).
More recently, the concept of enclosing has been used to analyze a second process, 
this time focused on knowledge commons (such as science, software, biodiversity or 
cultural production),4 key goods in the knowledge economy (Boyle, 2008, Vila-Viñas 
and Barandiaran, 2015). Knowledge commons have their own specificities, which imply 
some analytical consequences, the most relevant being that institutions of the commons 
do not depend on the nature of the goods on which they are established, although they 
might be conditioned by their characteristics.5 If the analysis is limited to early CPRs 
―termed traditional commons by Östrom― which tend to be local and to have a strong 
biophysical component, we might be tempted to think that these institutions are in 
decline and enclosing is already residual. However, the twentieth-century consolidation 
of institutions that share features with commons (although with State predominance) and 
the recent emergence of knowledge commons-based institutions have renewed the scene. 
Both their contrived configuration and the significant threat of enclosure confirm the legal 
and political nature of these categories. For instance, the option of establishing intellectual 
property rights over the use of certain biological forms or genomic characteristics (or 
regulating these fields in any way) does not depend on the nature of these goods that, 
together with other social relations, have long existed. However, the novelty lies in a 
change in the legal-political rationality that allows to specify certain aspects of those 
goods and either include them as others in the legal traffic or exclude their appropriability 
to establish other uses.
The expansion of the CPR notion and its renewed relevance is also due to its 
role in the context of the network society (Castells, 2004) or cognitive capitalism 
(Moulier-Boutang, 2011), in which knowledge has become the critical factor of labor 
and market processes. Although the knowledge-commons category is heterogeneous, it 
shares interesting features with traditional commons. While knowledge commons are 
often subtractive in nature —the wood taken from the forest by one community member 
can not be taken by another— “most types of knowledge have, on the other hand, been 
relatively nonsubtractive. Indeed, the more people that share useful knowledge, the greater 
the common good” (Hess and Östrom, 2016a: 30).6 This does not mean that knowledge 
commons are exempt from the social dilemmas that accompany these types of goods and 
their institutional dimension; for instance, CPR institutions should establish contribution 
4 Hess and Östrom (2016a: 32) understand knowledge as “all ideas, information and data which are 
intelligible in whatever form they are expressed or obtained”. The differences between data, information 
and other forms of knowledge are also explored in the paper.
5 Laval and Dardot (2015: 47–49) argued that there is a risk that the category of commons would be 
naturalized and thus reduced to a few goods related to archaic economies.
6 Authors such as Carol Rose (1986) have even put forward the idea of a cornucopia of knowledge commons. 
According to this characteristic, the more these goods are exploited the more productive they are and the 
more value they acquire.
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systems capable of sustaining their operation and sanctioning systems against behaviors that 
harm them (Hess and Östrom, 2016a: 38–39). In any event, institutionality and legislation 
are not a lesser evil for their governance. Neither traditional commons nor knowledge 
commons are natural commons to preserve, but human institutions to reproduce.
In terms of their biophysical characteristics, the most notable difference is the 
increasingly digital nature of knowledge commons.7 The commonality of these knowledge 
goods also faces the challenge of establishing institutions for the commons on a broader 
scale than traditional commons. It is true that some knowledge commons are still local 
―as a self-training group that teaches courses and runs a small library in a community 
social center― but many others need to operate on a wider, tending-toward global, scale 
such as the DOAJ database8 or the Linux operating system.
Although this distinction is interesting, knowledge commons are not a completely 
separate category from the whole of the commons. Laval and Dardot (2015) ―and Hardt 
and Negri (2009) before them― established a framework in which they insist that all 
commons are interconnected to the extent that they form their own social texture, that 
is, a set of practices and values differentiated from those of the market (private property 
rules) and from those of the State (principle of sovereignty rules). Therefore, it is not 
just a third type of goods, different from the majority of private goods and the minority 
of public goods, as neoclassic theory has put forward (Vercellone et al., 2015: 10–11). 
Although this approach is not as widespread and multifaceted as Östrom’s, it has the 
virtue of underlining the political and the conflicting dimension of these institutions. 
Consequently, in this extensive understanding of commons, the primacy of knowledge 
commons as a highly differentiated and prevalent category loses strength. For instance, its 
intangible character is questioned, due to the huge need for biophysical (schools, teachers) 
or digital (servers, cabling, etc.) infrastructures (Bratton, 2016) and to the biological needs 
of people that embody that knowledge, such as housing, food or security (Vercellone et 
al., 2014: 18 and ff.). The analysis of the elements of this second enclosure movement 
reveals that they are objects with material bases, such as seeds (Dafermos and Vivero-Pol, 
2015), biodiverse substances (Golinelli et al., 2015), human bodies (Rosenfeld and Mason, 
2013) and physical infrastructures supporting the Internet. In addition, the outputs of these 
institutions of commons are not only innovations in digital fields or frontier science, but 
also in social practices and linguistic and managerial skills that form the basis of the 
expansion of the personal services sector (Morini, 2014; Marazzi, 2011).
2. effectIVeness, rIsks and VulneraBIlItIes
Rather than pre-existing, commons are made, since they are fundamentally a 
practice of common doing, commoning.9 This notion has several implications. Firstly, it 
7 This makes Hess and Östrom’s initial analyses more complex and incorporates new differences. See 
Prainsack (2019).
8 Directory of Open Access Journals. See https://doaj.org/
9 See Linebaugh (2013: 64). This same immanent characterization of the communal rights leads Linebaugh 
to differentiate them from the human rights.
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emphasizes effectiveness. If institutions are to endure, they must be effective in achieving 
their objectives within a given and constantly evolving context. Secondly, institutional, 
regulatory, and organizational issues become paramount. These are features shared by 
various contemporary approaches to commons. On this consensus, Laval and Dardot 
(2015: 663) note that institutional activity is not just a managerial-technical task, but a 
political activity and, as such, subject to a variety of threats and conflicts. Indeed, the 
popularization of commons has run parallel to the hegemonic progression of neoliberal 
governmentality. This neoliberal rationality of government has proposed an alternative 
project to that of traditional and contemporary commons: it has tried to inscribe them in 
the same logic of appropriability, according to the absolute regime of property (Laval and 
Dardot, 2015: 109–110), better known as privatization in the political sphere.
This section introduces sources of vulnerability of the commons, with special 
attention paid to knowledge commons. The following section shows that these risks are 
shared with those risks impacting the effectiveness of rights, since both commons and rights 
aim to respond to essential needs. These risks should not be understood as small enclosures 
and changes in the governance of certain goods, but as part of a governmentality change 
that proposes replacing basic welfare institutions, such as “social property” (Castel, 2004: 
41–43), public services, the social rights of post-war constitutions (Offe, 1994: 127–134) 
and the emerging knowledge commons by another institutional network and regime of 
relations with oneself and others (Foucault, 2007: 275 and ff.).
How would a research agenda on the risks faced by commons be configured? 
Research into the effectiveness of rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights 
(ESCR), can use the violation approach, which focuses on studying the most frequent and 
significant violations to understand how they actually function and to design guarantees 
that a normative analysis would not make possible on its own (Chapman, 1996). The 
inductive method used by Östrom’s group established a classification of the most 
frequent institutional problems and organized them as: a) equity issues, relating to the 
balance between ownership and contribution to CPRs; b) efficiency issues, relating to 
the production, management and optimal use of the resource; and c) sustainability issues, 
relating to the long-term performance of the resource (Hess and Östrom, 2016a: 29). 
This approach is an adequate starting point to organize risks into three groups: access, 
sustainability, and democracy issues.10
2.1. Access
Access problems are related to the possibility of excluding individuals and groups 
from using and enjoying commons. This is a risk associated with the expansion of 
appropriability, that is, a management of commons under a property-based regime. For 
instance, this occurs with the expansion of intellectual property rights over knowledge 
commons, which promotes the establishment of new forms of exclusion (Prainsack, 2019: 
7 and ff.). This does not mean that the perfect regime for all commons is one of unlimited 
10 This set of risks is consistent with the fundamental principles that recent research on urban commons have 
noted, such as universality-inalienability, sustainability and democracy (Méndez de Andes et al., 2019: 1).
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open access, which might lead to dynamics of inequal competition and selectivity 
(Morozov, 2012; Tkacz, 2012) as well as risks for CPR sustainability. It is, therefore, usual 
for the communities behind commons to establish rules of exclusion or, at least, limited 
exploitation to prevent such perverse effects. Sometimes those limitations can be inferred 
from the very characteristics of the common good, for instance, scientific knowledge. 
Although it could be classified as a CPR, access to its outcomes or participation in scientific 
production are highly regularized through methodological rules imposed by the scientific 
community itself (Ahumada, 2012). Nevertheless, the fact that access to CPR depends on 
certain rules, which are necessary for their own functioning, does not mean they are all 
admissible in a rights-based approach (e.g., certain experiments are forbidden) nor that 
they are without consequences for the sustainability of the resource or the general interest.
2.2. Sustainability
CPRs that have persisted have been effective in achieving the goals their communities 
sought, but also in maintaining their sustainability.11 In contrast to this situation, feminist 
approaches to social reproduction have shown how neoliberal governmentality does not 
consider the relevance and cost of sustainability, thus putting the continuity of different 
forms of life at risk (Carrasco, 2014; Morini, 2014; Pérez Orozco, 2014; Dalla Costa, 
2009). Neoliberal strategies have taken advantage of the intangible and decentralized 
composition of many knowledge commons to subordinate CPR sustainability to the benefit 
of intellectual property rights holders (Vila-Viñas and Barandiaran, 2015). This is contrary 
to the functioning of knowledge. First, it is not possible to extract knowledge completely 
from the person who embodies it to insert it into a production cycle as a part of capital, as 
another factor of production and, second, neither is it possible to individualize it entirely 
in the position of a particular worker who is paid to use their knowledge. As indicated, 
governmentality of corporative welfare (Rose and Miller, 1992: 23; Vila-Viñas, 2014: 201 
and ff) proposed the creation of some major social devices to address these problems and 
to socialize risks: public education and public health services that could ensure knowledge 
expansion, transfer systems that could protect in times of labor inactivity and rising wages 
and a huge proportion of unpaid and subordinated female labor.
Neoliberal governmentality has added strategies of appropriation of commons, 
usually known as commodification and privatization (Foucault, 2007: 177–179). That 
expansion of the appropriability of CPR outcomes without an equivalent contribution to 
11 See principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions in Östrom (1990: 90–102). As Vercellone 
et al. (2015: 18) posit, the innovation of knowledge CPRs “recalls ecological and collective problems that 
were missing from the notions of rivalrousness and non-rivalrousness in consumption. The term common-
pool resource makes the ecological problem plain by referring to the equilibrium between the stock and flow 
necessary to guarantee the reproduction of a resource”.
12 Some data may clarify the context of vulnerability of the young population in Spain. In the last quarter of 
2019, only 18.6% of young people aged 16–29 were emancipated (at the same time in 2008, this proportion 
was 26.1%). Development runs parallel to the prices of rental housing, which has risen from 55.7% to 94% 
of a worker’s salary during the same period (Source: Injuve. Observatorio de Emancipación). The average 
age for emancipation in EU is 26 years old and 29 in Spain (Source: Eurostat). The risk of child poverty in 
Spain was 26.8 in 2018 (Source: ECV, 2008–2018). The average age for having the first child for women in 
Spain was 31 years old in 2018 (Source: INE).
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their renewal involves a risk for the sustainability of knowledge commons. Consequently, 
although identifying the risk of the ecological collapse of some CPRs is usual, pointing 
out social and political risks is less so (Vercellone, 2011: 90, 103–5). These risks are 
shared with those that threaten the effectiveness of social rights in Spain, such as the right 
to housing or the right to a dignified life for some groups.12 Furthermore, if neoliberal 
governmentality has increased the capture of CPR resources without the corresponding 
replenishment, the shift to austerity (Blyth, 2013; Baker, 2010) has increased the pressure 
on these resources, even with the sacrifice of economic profit in favor of preserving the 
status quo.13
2.3. Democracy
These access and sustainability risks are related to institutional and democratic 
risks. As Boyle (2008: 51) noted, if the tradition of intellectual property rights as an 
exception has shifted to becoming the norm, it is because of some shortcomings in the 
democratic development of these new regulations. One aspect that is easily forgotten 
in the description of the enclosing process from a socio-legal perspective is that it not 
only puts universal access at risk, by allowing exclusions and discriminations based 
on property rights that tend toward the absolute, but also CPR sustainability, when it 
leads to resource exploitation that is not compensated by enough contributions to renew 
it. In addition, these enclosures also involve a risk for autonomous CPR governance. 
Östrom’s group identified the importance of the community that embodies CPRs and 
its institutional capacity, firstly, to provide rules for self-governance and, secondly, to 
provide mechanisms to deal with conflicts and to strengthen compliance with these 
rules. In this regard, if a CPR becomes appropriable, it means any holder of the property 
rights can manage it exclusively. On a resource scale, this centralizes responsibilities 
that were formerly distributed throughout the community, even if there was a certain 
level of differentiation and specialization in how they were performed. On an ecosystem 
scale based on knowledge commons, such as the contemporary knowledge economy, this 
hierarchizes its functioning. For instance, the acronym GAFA14 now not only refers to 
the main economic stakeholders, but also to political stakeholders capable of deciding on 
the form and effects of communications or cultural consumption (Zuboff, 2019; Cancela, 
2019; Morozov, 2018).
A similar situation is observed in science, which is also a knowledge commons 
and the object of a right (Morgera, 2015; Plomer, 2015; Shaheed, 2014). Most evident 
violations are due to the discrimination of some populations regarding their access to 
some medical treatments or to water purification methods, but their continued exclusion 
from scientific knowledge (e.g., by a reduction in public investment in science or by a 
13 Before the austerity approach became widespread in many peripheral states, Dean (2003: 167–170) 
describes it as reflexive governmentality, where the primary objective is the security and stability of 
government and all other objectives are subordinated.
14 Information on the technological sector refers to GAFA or Big Four (Google, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon) and also GAFAM or Big Five, including Microsoft, to refer to these major stakeholders.
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concentration of patents) has an effect on their possibilities to direct scientific knowledge 
in accordance with their values and interests, something that it is usually reflected in 
constitutional texts or in international covenants on rights. This introduces the risk that 
knowledge is no longer a mechanism of emancipation but a mechanism of domination 
(Laval and Dardot, 2015: 254–5; Shaver, 2015).
2.4. Responses
The social-corporate governmentality of welfare generated its own set of 
preventions regarding these risks, that is, increasing access to basic goods through state 
solidarity systems and public services, along with contribution devices that allowed for 
their expansion. Both production and life cycles were organized around corporation culture 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002), sexual division of labor (Fink, 2001; Lewis, 1997) and 
state bureaucracy development for the management of these welfare arrangements (Rose, 
1996: 46). This set of welfarist solutions returns with force when the neoliberal or austere 
enclosing movement is at its most severe.
In spite of this, the commons tradition has been reluctant to an exclusively state-
based response, either due to its liberal roots (such as Östrom’s group), its cooperativist15 
and municipalist tradition (Restakis, 2015), or the pragmatic need to balance the capture 
power of the private sector (Horel, 2019) and of prevalent groups in the State (Jessop, 
2008; Vila-Viñas, 2014: 53). These positions underscore the leadership of communities 
and the progressive democratization of social property managed by the State, either in the 
form of welfare devices or of public services. These critical approaches also evidence the 
existence of a fundamental division between public and private in our political imaginary. 
When principles of access, sustainability and democracy have been extended to private 
goods, justifications about the antagonism between economic efficiency and democratic 
management often emerge. Based on the greater importance of commons in the knowledge 
economy, only recently has the relevance of the commons-based production regimes 
(Benkler, 2006) increased, that is, a production where “no one uses exclusive rights to 
organize effort or capture its value, and when cooperation is achieved through social 
mechanisms other than price signals or managerial directions” (Benkler, 2004: 1110).
In a welfare regime, the response to these and other social risks was organized 
around the opposition between commodified and de-commodified spheres. In the latter, 
the right to access essential goods was guaranteed for some social groups (Esping-
15 From this approach, this government, built over the praxis of the common (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 266) 
should be differentiated from the extremes of pure sovereignty and simple management: “thinking in terms 
of a collective practice related with the use of the unavailable. Neither government nor management, but 
a collective active use through which everyone participates in the coproduction of non-state legal norms” 
(Laval and Dardot, 2015: 306).
16 Most critical approaches to the State, such as Laval and Dardot (2015), equate the political effects of 
market and State rationality. In the framework proposed by this paper, this identification is incompatible 
with the constitutional-positivist systems of rights. As a result, the framework or structuring of the public and 
the commons will be used more often than market rationality and the absolute character of property rights.
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Andersen, 2007). Based on a commons approach, the opposition would not be organized 
between market and State rationalities. The most usual opposition would be between 
market rationality (organized around an absolute notion of property rights) and commons 
rationality.16 This approach would change the view of the risks of access, sustainability 
and democracy, which are risks shared between the commons and the de-commodified 
sphere in welfare systems. This would also allow for a more realistic response to current 
rights violations.
3. legal Impact
Since the commons approach became popular in politics and academia, several 
proposals have tried to use it in the legal field. The best known, mainly from US Law 
Schools, exposed the extent of intellectual property rights, in parallel to the emergence of 
the field of information and communication technologies (Boyle, 2008; Harvey, 2007: 64–
65; Lessig, 2004; Bollier, 2003). At the same time, they explored alternative regulations 
of property rights over knowledge goods that were the subject of this second enclosures 
movement. Consequently, intellectual property rights compatible with principles of 
commons were designed in the fields of cultural and scientific production (as creative 
commons or copyleft licenses), of software (Lessig, 2006), or of hardware (Pearce, 2014; 
Lazalde et al., 2015). A common-based production system was also presented (Benkler, 
2006), so it could serve as an alternative to production organization that is increasingly 
based on closed intellectual property rights.
Research conducted by constitutional law was added to these alternatives offered 
mainly by private law. The relevance of law as the fabric of the network of plural social 
relations was underlined based on the social law tradition (Gurvitch, 2005). The issue was 
knowing the role the political rationality of commons could play in that task of improving 
not only the governance of certain goods and productive processes, but also of the social 
whole and its political dimension. To this end, spaces of local democracy have been the 
main field of research, hand in hand with processes of co-government of public services,17 
in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.18 A recent example of this approach is the 
recovery of privatized services under a new logic that is not exclusively public (Cangelosi, 
2019: 80). On a broader scale, the main object of criticism has been the expansion of an 
17 Cases in the Emilia-Romagna region are well known, where a management system of some public services 
by entities of social and solidarity economy was chosen (Restakis, 2015), and democratization processes of 
psychiatric institutions were implemented (Basaglia, 1972).
18 In the public management sphere, this principle proposes that the community directly manage a service 
or public resource where possible, while the state should only intervene when direct management by the 
community is not possible (Restakis, 2015: 604 and ff.).
19 See Vercellone et al., 2015: 4–5: “Moreover, from the concrete experiences analyzed here, the idea 
emerges that the concept of common goods can constitute a concrete alternative, and that includes on a legal 
footing [Rodotà Commission]. Therefore, the common is the product of a social and institutional structure 
that demonstrates forms of governing and social co-operation that guarantee its production, reproduction 
and spread. The new institutions of the common that emerge from these constituent practices constitute a 
general principle of self-governance of society and self-organization of social production, proposing a new 
division between common, public and private”.
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absolute property right (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 529 and ff.; Hardt and Negri, 2009: 3 and 
ff.), which has become a material limit for the effectiveness of our human-rights systems. 
These approaches, as a whole, have generated a pluralization of the legal field, introducing 
a common realm between the classic public (State-sovereignty) and private (individual-
property) dichotomy.19 It is a new realm linked to the ecological one and its inappropriable 
nature (Mattei, 2011: 10–12), in contrast to the “fundamental structure [of] the rule of a 
subject (an individual, a company, the government) over an object (a private good, an 
organization, a territory)” (Mattei, 2011: 6), which has prevailed until now.
One thread that could link the concept of commons with our legal traditions would 
be custom. Some historical examples, such as the English Magna Carta, and, in particular, 
the Charter of the Forest, of 1225, recognize pre-existing institutions of the commons, with 
their rights nested (Linebaugh, 2008). Based on objectivist and iusnaturalist perspectives 
of the legitimacy of rights, the episodes of rights recognition in positive legal norms would 
be the legal consolidation of legitimate and legally relevant pre-existing practices (Pérez 
Luño, 2013: 58 and ff.).20 Within the framework of this paper, the interest in custom stems 
from its democratic legitimacy, as a repeated practice with a general awareness of its legal 
enforceability. However, from a democratic perspective, the main feature of commons 
is their institutional and normative character. As noted above, one of the most consistent 
principles that Östrom’s group found in the analyzed CPR (Östrom, 1990: 90–102) was the 
creation of the rules of operation by the communities behind the CPRs. These rules were 
later recognized by the external authority. Therefore, both CPR creation and continuity 
are not spontaneous and, instead, obligations and legal links between the members of 
their communities are very important (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 173). All this brings to 
light the political and institutional dimension of these resources in contrast to the activity 
of mere management. CPRs are institutions capable of producing norms from certain sets 
of practices and conflicting relationships with alternative strategies for governing those 
resources.21
This configuration of commons has two legal consequences. First, by highlighting 
the institutional dimension,22 the relational aspects of legal practice are also emphasized. The 
starting point is no longer the autonomous subject that uses the world or things in an abstract 
20 Although it is not the main object of their research, Laval and Dardot (2015: 352 and ff.) criticize the 
political effects of this connection between customs and commons because: 1) it does not reflect the process 
of formation of some commons, such as recent knowledge commons; 2) customary norms arise from a 
particular network of power relationships, which are difficult to translate into the present; and 3) they are 
not necessarily in line with the principles of the common, and, to show that, they point to succession law, 
which they define as an obstacle for the institutions of the common.
21 “Unlike ‘management’, ‘government’ assumes conflicts and seeks to overcome them through a decision 
concerning the rules. Instituting praxis is, therefore, a practice of governing the commons through the 
conflicts that give them life” (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 663).
22 In their conclusions, Laval and Dardot (2015: 662–663) maintain a concept of commons quite separate 
from the more extended meaning as common goods or, as argued in this paper, as institutions of the commons, 
close to a CPR notion. Although it is an interesting concept because it underlines some characteristics noted 
in this paper, it is far removed from the general meaning of these concepts, both in legal and political 
spheres, and is thus less useful.
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manner, in accordance with the modern subject-nature division, it is rather an institution 
formed by a practice of a community of interdependent subjects operating in a given context. 
This context is sometimes local, such as the running of an irrigation system, and sometimes 
global, such as the evolution of a scientific discipline. At the same time, institutions are 
never isolated, but function in a relational manner, in accordance with the induced features 
and conditions of their ecosystem, that is, based on immanent normativeness.
Second, this institutional life is dynamic. CPRs are artificial and there is not an 
obligation to sustain them; rather, it depends on their usefulness for the objectives of the 
community that embodies them. Based on this perspective, the attention paid by legal 
positivism when a legal norm is enacted becomes less important and, instead, the focus 
shifts to the changes in the effectiveness of existing norms. These are adapted as the 
environment evolves, either implicitly or explicitly, by developing new more specific 
norms, resolving conflicts and allocating sanctions and rewards; that is the reason why the 
prevalent legal form of CPR governance is made up of principles rather than rules (Prieto 
Sanchís, 1996). This legal tool makes it possible, firstly, to establish the translation of the 
community’s material values and goals and, secondly, to serve as a hermeneutic criterion 
so that daily CPR governance can adapt to changes. It is, therefore, a dynamic concept in 
which the efficacy of norms and guarantee mechanisms become key elements.
3.1. Human-rights approach
This paper proposes that the commons approach has elements akin to the 
human-rights approach. Thus, the development and use of the former can enhance some 
aspects of the latter that will be explained in this section: 1) it strengthens the focus on 
the effectiveness of the rights; 2) in particular, on their factual dimension, that is, the 
dimension related to specific violations aimed at designing more appropriate and effective 
strategies and guarantees; 3) the commons approach reduces the distance and hierarchy 
between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural ones; and 4) all this 
improves the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.
Regarding the first issue, it should be noted that the commons are sets of practices 
that must find their own normative path to becoming institutionalized. Consequently, the 
distance between the normative and descriptive dimension is reduced. In a process that 
is analogous to the recognition of new rights, norms of the institutions of the commons 
respond to immanent needs that are consolidated. When the democratic principle is also 
operating properly, the whole community participates in fulfilling these rules.23 Due to 
the energy invested in the development and adjustment of norms and their relevance for 
institutional sustainability (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 172, 419 and ff.), it is foreseeable 
that communities will pay attention to their efficacy, to the most frequent violations and 
23 Although many political stories show both the institutions of the common and those ruled by the ownership 
principle as an isolated world, in fact both institution types share one world. Researching the flexibilization 
that this interdependence imposes on implementing the institutional principles of commons is needed, such 
as the flexibilization of the democratic principle in social and solidarity economy, with the introduction of 
some hierarchies within commons governance.
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to when these are no longer isolated situations but reflect systematic vulnerabilities. Risk 
management around problems of access, sustainability and democracy, which have been 
outlined in the previous section, has aimed to show that certain risks and vulnerabilities 
are shared between commons institutions and human rights, particularly ESCR.
Concerning the second issue, this strategic approach has resulted in the importance 
of techniques to control and guarantee the effectiveness of the main institutional principles 
(similar to human rights for society as a whole), and establishing the necessary claiming and 
self-execution mechanisms.24 The commons institutional perspective operates on the basis of 
a flexibilization of the contours separating those who establish the norms, those who apply 
them and those bound by them or who claim judicial protection in the event of a violation: 
an institutional development space is created to make commons (commoning) and rights.
Relating to the third issue, the distance and the hierarchy between civil and 
political rights, on the one hand, and ESCR, on the other, are blurred.25 Indeed, as noted 
above, the effectiveness of social rights such as access to education, health or science, 
together with a progressive system of fiscal contributions for their sustainability, is at the 
heart of the development of knowledge commons, which are conditions of the current 
knowledge economy.26 A distinction between these two groups is rather less useful in 
relation to problems and strategies posed by commons, as some examples show. In 
the case of science, the impossibility of accessing this resource not only harms their 
economic status, but also the free development of their personality and their dignity. 
Women’s unequal access to social prevention devices, such as a pension system,27 not 
only affects their economic status, but also their independence, for instance in accessing 
a life free of violence (Bodelón, 2014; Meyersfeld, 2012). It is naive to think that the 
damage suffered by the planet will impact only on the social and economic aspects of 
life, without conditioning civil and political rights, as is evident in the face of any major 
public health alarm. Although this pragmatic nature is found at the heart of commons, the 
way of addressing institutional risks generates chains of equivalence between different 
24 Aparicio (2017) has criticized the lack of attention that research has paid to mechanisms of self-execution 
of rights. Consequently, it might be interesting to recall the existing lines of exclusion in the access to 
court. As Mattei (2011: 5) has noted: “Furthermore, it has always been problematic for the commons to find 
someone that would represent them in court, by suing those who tried to seize them. Both historically and 
today, those who benefit most from the commons are not ‘owners’ in the technical sense, but usually poor 
farmers (or today young internet surfers) with no means of getting into the court system”.
25 See Gómez Isa (2011) and Calvo García (2016) about how this hierarchy has worked in recent contexts 
of economic crises.
26 As Vercellone et al. (2015: 31) state: “the increase in the part of capital called intangible is closely linked 
to the development of the institutions and collective services of welfare. In particular, it should in fact be 
emphasised how is actually the expansion of the collective welfare services that has allowed the development 
of mass education, carrying out a key role in the formation of what we can call collective intelligence or 
widespread intellectuality: it is in fact the latter, widespread intellectuality that explains the most significant 
part of the increase in the capital referred to as intangible which, as is emphasised, today represents the 
essential element of a territory’s potential growth and competitiveness”.
27 The Spanish gender gap in retirement pensions has reached 34.6%, which means that women earn on 
average almost €6,000 less per year than men per year for this item (UGT, 2019).
28 See Laval and Dardot (2015: 524): “politics of the common aims at the reorganization of the social by 
substituting use rights for the principle of property as the juridical lever of social and political transformation”.
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spheres, underlining their strategic value: claims for access to goods include the right 
to participate in their governance and to determine the norms that will help them endure 
and evolve (Laval and Dardot, 2015: 121–122), for instance, how commons question the 
extension of property rights as absolute since modernity. By linking access to property 
with freedom, independence and, thus, dignity, liberalism showed that rights are integral 
(Locke, 1990 [1690]). As happens in commons, the right to access is a right to participate 
in the governance of their institutions, on condition that it is not an absolute right, but part 
of a bundle of rights that form an interdependent institutionality.28 Consequently, violations 
in any of their dimensions (social or political) would put at risk not only one aspect of 
a person’s rights, but the inter-institutional whole. Concerning the third issue, all this 
explains why using new categories, such as commons, might result in a relegitimization of 
contemporary legal categories and the functioning of the legal, political, and social order.
4. conclusIons
In recent decades, the study of CPRs has become increasingly relevant within 
social sciences. It has also been updated with the inclusion of knowledge commons. This 
concept emphasizes more inclusive use of resources and, above all, a normativeness and 
institutionality built by their own communities. In short, the notion of commons does not 
refer so much to a resource with certain characteristics as to a set of practices (commoning) 
aimed at raising institutions of the commons.
Of course, under the hegemony of neoliberal and, more recently, austerity-based 
governmentalities, these institutions face risks. This paper has sought to organize these 
risks in terms of access, sustainability, and democracy. In a sense, contemporary commons 
risks, in their second enclosing movement, are shared with the risks facing the effectiveness 
of human rights, particularly ESCR.
This paper proposes that the commons approach has elements akin to the human-
rights approach. Consequently, the development and use of commons can enhance 
the human-rights approach in some aspects: 1) it strengthens the focus on the rights’ 
effectiveness; 2) in particular, on their factual dimension, that is, the dimension related 
to specific violations aimed at designing more appropriate and effective strategies and 
guarantees; 3) the commons approach reduces the distance and hierarchy between civil 
and political rights and economic, social and cultural ones; and 4) all this improves the 
legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.
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